The contemporary confluence of globalization and ethical pluralism is at the origin of many ethical challenges that confront business nowadays, both in practice and in theory. One of the challenges arising from the development of globalization has to do with respect for cultural diversity. It is often said that the success of economic globalization tends towards social and cultural homogeneity. To the extent that cultural diversity is usually seen as a valuable reality, that global trend seems to contradict our efforts (...) to respect ethical pluralism, both personal and cultural, within society. In this paper I argue that (a) ethical minimalism, despite its emphasis on tolerance and justice, does not take pluralism seriously into account in present-day society, and (b) ethical minimalism is not suited to balancing the homogenizing trend of globalization. Certainly ethical norms are necessary, but by no means are they sufficient in themselves to encourage either justice or tolerance; nor are they sufficient to inspire and encourage good practices and sound regulations. Instead, virtue-based ethics has the capacity of inspiring and encouraging good practices. Particularly, virtue-based ethics is able to inspire a serious dialogue about ethical and legal issues both in the public arena and within organizations. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to view Kant's approach to education in the broader context of Kant's philosophy of culture and history as a process whose direction should be reflectively assumed by human freedom, in the light of man's moral vocation. In this context, some characteristic tensions of his enlightened approach to education appear. Thus, while Kant takes the educational process to be a radically moral enterprise all the way through—and hence, placed in a relational context—he also aspires to (...) constitute education as a science, to be improved through experiments, thereby paving the way for a systemic approach to education; in spite of its moral inspiration, his systemic approach not only could enter into conflict with the moral demand of taking each individual subject as an end, but is also marked by an intrinsic paradox, already involved in the ambiguity of the term ‘humanity’, which might mean a) humanity as a moral disposition present in each individual human being or b) humanity as a whole, as the ‘human species’. (shrink)

This book joins the contemporary recovery of Kant’s empirical works to highlight the relevance of his concept of culture for understanding the sources of various characteristic modern dilemmas, such as the tension between culture and happiness, the morally ambivalent nature of cultural progress, or the existing conflicts between a factual plurality of cultures and the historical forces pressing toward a universal civilization. The book will be of special interest for Kantian scholars, moral and political philosophers, as well as philosophers of (...) culture. (shrink)

The Fourth Industrial Revolution based on digitalization, the development of AI, robotics, big data, and increasing automation is dredging up older debates on the end of human work. This article contributes to this debate arguing that these changing circumstances represent an opportunity to advance a renewed consideration of human work. By emphasizing its most distinctively human dimensions, including gratuitousness, relationality, and meaningfulness, we propose the articulation of a social model that recognizes relational goods as a specific contribution of human work (...) in an attempt to overcome the state and the market's monopoly of public life built around the dichotomy between the private and the public. Such a social model is based on the concept of circular subsidiarity, which represents a departure from traditional notions of subsidiarity by promoting a dynamic and reciprocal interplay between three essential societal spheres: the state, the market, and organized civil society, all of which have their role to fulfill by providing security, efficiency, and relational goods. Ultimately, this article suggests that circular subsidiarity can lead to a more inclusive and equitable social model by acknowledging how relational goods not only humanize civil society but also sustain the functioning of both the market and the state. (shrink)

The expression “a culture of freedom” is unmistakably modern. Yet its meaning is not immediately clear. My purpose in this paper is to clarify the possible meaning of this expression by taking Kant’s practical philosophy as a point of reference. In order to do so, I will depart from Kant’s explicit conception of culture, and try to relate it to his own distinction between external and internal freedom, especially as it appears in the Metaphysics of Morals.

Although Kant is not usually counted among the forerunners of social sciences, any look at the work of the most prominent social theorists of the past century shows the pervasive influence of Kant's philosophy. This influence is obvious and crucial at the epistemological level, if only because Kant himself set the frame for subsequent discussion of the difference between human and natural sciences. Yet, Kant's work is also rich in substantive contributions to social theory, which may be articulated around his (...) conception of culture and cultural progress. (shrink)

In Understanding Moral Obligation (2012), Robert Stern sets out to provide a fresh interpretation of the role of autonomy in Kant’s moral philosophy and attempts to rectify J. B. Schneewind’s standard account in The Invention of Autonomy (1998). While Stern agrees that Kant’s resort to autonomy is at the basis of a constructivist account of moral obligation, he claims that autonomy plays no role in Kant’s theory of value, such that, in this respect, Kant remains a realist. Accordingly, Stern characterizes (...) Kant’s moral philosophy as a “hybrid” view because he sees it as involving a compromise between realism with regard to value and constructivism with regard to obligation. Stern’s interpretation relies on a sharp distinction between value and obligation. The purpose of the present article is to question his reliance on that rigid distinction, which involves intermixing theoretical and practical reason and assumes a distorted view of human agency. (shrink)

This article explores one aspect of Kant's crucial contribution to the philosophy of culture. It does so by analysing two different approaches to the notion of culture, which are explicit in his work. The first, which may be called "genetical", presents culture almost as a result of a natural dialectic. The second, which I call "practical", regards culture as a task for the human being.

In this article, I explore the way in which Korsgaard’s approach to obligation as springing from the reflective rejection of that which threatens one’s own identity can account for obligations towards others, without making the latter relative to obligations to oneself. To this end, I begin by stressing the role of reflexivity in ethical relationships, and show how this reflexivity is mediated by reference to law, which applies both to the self and to the other. On this basis, I then (...) argue that Korsgaard’s account of the interplay between practical and moral identity reflects the very structure of practical reason, which requires both a particular and a universal premise in order to issue practical reasons for action– and the corresponding obligations. Within this framework, I argue that Korsgaard’s solution to the problem outlined above lies in having stressed the shareable character of reasons such that it is neither your reason nor my reason that obligates me, but rather reason as such. This solution, however, requires a further argument aimed at clarifying what makes your reasons different from my own. (shrink)

RESUMEN:En este trabajo se analiza el modo en que Kant distingue entre sentimiento y emoción, por un lado, y emoción y pasión, por otro, para mostrar: 1) que bajo el término “emoción” Kant entiende principalmente la afección orgánica privada de contenido cognitivo, aunque precedida y seguida de representaciones; 2) que la emoción constituye un elemento integral de lo que Kant denomina “sentimiento”, término del que se sirve para designar la dimensión subjetiva de la experiencia en sentido amplio, no limitado a (...) la afección empírica; 3) que su concepción negativa de la pasión justifica la posterior distinción entre emoción y pasión introducida en los estudios científicos. ABSTRACT:In this article I analyze Kant’s distinction between feeling and emotion, on the one hand, and emotion and passion, on the other. The objective is to show: 1) that by the term “emotion” he understands organic affection, deprived of cognitive content, although preceded and followed by representations; 2) that emotion so understood constitutes for Kant an integral part of “feeling”, by which Kant designates the subjective dimension of experience, in a broad sense, which is not limited to empirical affection; 3) that his negative approach to passion justifies the sharp distinction between emotion and passion introduced in scientific studies of emotion. (shrink)

In this article I argue the relevance of natural law for framing and addressing ethical issues raised by the practice of business in a global context. There are historical, as well as systematic reasons for this. On the historical side, it can be argued that the origin of modern economics is linked to a cultural context, still influenced by modern natural law theories. Thus, even if Hume’s moral theory is everything but a natural law theory, either in the traditional or (...) the modern sense, his “laws of nature” (fixation of property, rules for its transference, and promises) represent a systematization of the rules of justice necessary to preserve the space of economic freedom required for development of a commercial society. This systematization is in line with the classical approach to natural law, which nevertheless presents further advantages for developing an ethical approach to economic activity, since it brings with itself a conception of economic agency richer than that of Hume: a conception that is not necessarily linked to pursuit self-interest, but rather is inspired by ethical motives right from the start. Indeed, on the systematic side, the classical natural law is seen as the law of practical reason: a set of principles in charge of inspiring both virtuous action and legal practice, so that we can realize the human good. Assuming the embodied and social nature of human beings, as well as the various cultural realizations of humanity, a natural law approach to ethics is in a position to stimulate a dynamic and bottomup articulation of the personal and common good, concern for progress and sustainable development, universal principles and cultural variations. (shrink)

Además del concepto explícito de cultura como perfeccionamiento de la naturaleza, que podemos reconocer en muchos lugares del corpus kantiano, la entera empresa crítica puede considerarse cultura en un sentido más profundo: cultura como proyección de una subjetividad que busca en la naturaleza los indicios del destino racional y moral del hombre. Según esto, la filosofía kantiana puede verse como una filosofía de la cultura, posible, en última instancia, por la reflexividad de la razón, que advierte sus propios intereses, y (...) configura el mundo conforme a ellos. (shrink)

In this interview Christine M. Korsgaard answers several questions on her particular interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy. More specifically, she dwells on the role of the noumenal/phenomenal distinction for a better understanding of Kant's idea of practical reason, as well as on the compatibility between Aristotelian and Kantian practical reason. In addition, she answers a couple of more general questions on the perspectives and challenges of contemporary ethical theory.

Populism’s Challenges to Political Reason can be seen as a consequence of social and cultural trends, the so called ‘emotional culture’, that have been accentuated in recent decades. By considering those trends, this article aims at shedding light on some distinctive marks of contemporary populism in order to argue for a reconfiguration of the public sphere that, without ignoring emotion, recovers argumentation and persuasion based on facts and reason.

Populism’s Challenges to Political Reason can be seen as a consequence of social and cultural trends, the so called ‘emotional culture’, that have been accentuated in recent decades. By considering those trends, this article aims at shedding light on some distinctive marks of contemporary populism in order to argue for a reconfiguration of the public sphere that, without ignoring emotion, recovers argumentation and persuasion based on facts and reason.

Bentley et al.--O’Brien bypass the relevance of emotions in decision-making, resulting in a possible over-simplification of behavioral types. We propose integrating emotions, both in the north-south axis (in relation to cognition) as well as in the west-east axis (in relation to social influence), by suggesting a Z axis, in charge of registering emotional depth and involvement.

After many years drawing attention to the differences between Aristotelian and Kantian Ethics, recent scholarship tends to stress their commonalties instead. Among the authors representing this trend of contemporary moral philosophy, Christine Korsgaard has undoubtedly a leading role. Without denying the differences existing between them, Korsgaard has been particularly keen on calling our attention to their shared views.Yet Korsgaard herself has acknowledged an obvious difference between Aristotle and Kant, regarding their approach to emotions : unlike Kant, Aristotle does not think (...) of inclinations and emotions as mere feelings, but rather as valuable sources of information about morally salient aspects of our situation. In other words : they provide us with (germinal) reasons for action. Korsgaard, however, keeps this difference at the level of moral psychology, arguing that it does not make a great difference at the level of ethical theory. Now, this is precisely what I find controversial. My point is that this sort of difference imports a more fundamental one about practical reason in its entirety, a difference which used to be preserved in Kant’s own reference to a “pure practical reason” – against which Aristotle’s might be called “impure practical reason”. (shrink)

The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the difference between deliberate action and spontaneous action, and see how Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume and Kant approach this topic.

Se explora la justificación que ofrece Hume del gobierno en dos momentos, y, a partir de ahí, los argumentos con los que pretende salvar la posibilidad de la resistencia civil sin afirmar tajantemente un derecho a la resistencia. Para ello pone en juego su distinción entre obligación natural —u obligación de interés—y obligación moral —-avalada por el sentimiento. Al hilo de esta distinción puede señalarse un criterio para distinguir normalidad y excepción, y, eventualmente, el tipo de situación que podría respaldar (...) acciones de resistencia civil. (shrink)

This book is a major contribution to the renewed interest in natural law. It provides the reader with a comprehensive overview of natural law, both from a historical and a systematic point of view. It ranges from the mediaeval synthesis of Aquinas through the early modern elaborations of natural law, up to current discussions on the very possibility and practical relevance of natural law theory for the contemporary mind.

La idea moderna de derechos humanos y el concepto clásico de ley natural no son equivalentes. Ciertamente comparten la idea de que no toda ley es convencional. Pero más allá de esto, la noción clásica de ley natural es definida claramente en el marco de las virtudes y, consecuentemente, tiene una orientación más práctica y está atada más de cerca a la historia; la noción de derechos humanos, que han heredado las teorías modernas de los derechos naturales, conduce a la (...) subjetivación del concepto de derecho y tiende a separar al ser humano de su contexto histórico y político, donde los eventos se llevan a cabo. En ese sentido, el concepto clave asociado con los derechos humanos es aquel de “dignidad”. Dado que las dos ideas tienen diferentes puntos de partida y son diferentes en su estatuto epistemológico, no hay, estrictamente hablando, fundamento alguno para imaginar una síntesis de las dos teorías. En el plano teórico sólo podemos hablar de su complementariedad. La síntesis es algo que sólo surgirá en la práctica. (shrink)

In order to clarify the status of morality, this paper tries to answer the following questions: 1. Which is the difference between morality and happiness in Aristotle? 2. How does Thomas Aquinas assume the aristotelian ethics whithin a christian frame? 3. What has aristotelian and thomistic ethics in common? 4. Which is the main difference between their concept of morality and the modern one.

This paper focuses on the third chapter of Fides et ratio, entitled Intellego ut credam This sentence is usually connected with the preambula fidei, truths which are supposed to prepare human mind to receive the gift of faith. But in this case, Pope John Paul II develops this sentence in a different, more existential way according to which the real preambula fidei are not so much a set of truths as the real man who seeks the truth with his entire (...) life. This interpretation remarks the practical dimmension of the relationship between man and truth. (shrink)

This cross-disciplinary collection of essays focuses on gender from multiple perspectives. The main themes include human rights, political economy, cultural diversity, democracy, immigration, dignity, care, and shifts in hegemonic male models of societies.

In the following pages, our specific aim is to show how Hume’s analysis of justice provides the occasion for the gradual display of some key elements of a psychosocial action theory, which lay the foundations for later social thinking. -/- RESUMEN: En lo que sigue, nuestro objetivo específico es mostrar cómo el análisis que realiza Hume de la justicia proporciona la ocasión para introducir de manera gradual elementos clave para el desarrollo de una teoría psico-social de la acción, presupuesta en (...) buena parte del pensamiento social posterior. (shrink)

I argue that Rawls’ reading of Kant has been a major influence on the work of some contemporary Kantian scholars. Rawls’ influence on the new Kantian moral theory can be recognized in several points: a) the conception of philosophy as a “deeply practical project”, which leads to the adoption of a first-person approach to ethics; b) the reception of Kant’s philosophy within a pragmatic context, which leads to play down the metaphysical implications of Kant’s dualisms, in favor of an interpretation (...) which seems plausible within a political culture given in advance c) a characteristic interpretation of Kant’s moral constructivism, which while stressing the primacy of the right over the good, tries to specify the ways in which the good plays a role in morals, thereby opening a way to show the relevance of the empirical in Kant’s ethics d) an approach to Kant’s practical reason which stresses the complementarities between the Hypothetical and the Categorical Imperative, interpreted in the light of Rawls’ distinction between the Rational and the Reasonable; e) the central role played by the concept of “rational nature” in the new Kantian moral theory, which may likewise be related to Rawls’ concern for clarifying the conception of the person behind his approach to practical reason. (shrink)

El uso habitual del lenguaje reconocía hasta hace todavía relativamente poco tiempo un sentido ético-normativo en los términos "natural" y "naturaleza". De un tiempo a esta parte, sin embargo, ha penetrado profunda¬mente en el sentido común epocal la idea de la diferenciación del hombre con respecto a la naturaleza. De ahí que, ante la invitación a secundar la naturaleza, no sea infrecuente escuchar la respuesta: "¿por qué? ¡si yo soy un ser racional, una persona!". Esta mentalidad coexiste culturalmente con la (...) cre¬ciente conciencia ecológica, que puede interpretarse como una invitación a considerarnos de nuevo como seres naturales. La invitación nos llega cuando ya hemos aprendido a vernos como seres libres, y a defender nuestra libertad; cuando en el discurso ético, términos como "dignidad" y "persona" han pasado a desempeñar el papel privilegiado que en otro tiempo desempeñaba el término "naturaleza": la fuerza retórica que en otro tiempo tenía el término "naturaleza", la tiene hoy el término "libertad". El reto es ahora conciliar el logro principal de la filosofía moderna –somos libertad– con la herencia clásica -somos naturaleza-. La tesis que se defiende en este trabajo es que, lejos de representar un obstáculo para la dignidad y la libertad real del hombre, la apelación a la naturaleza es lo único que garantiza que el término dignidad sea algo más que una palabra cargada de fuerza retórica para los occidentales. (shrink)

In the light of the variety of approaches to the study of emotions, the purpose of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, to draw attention to the cultural assumptions of experimental approaches to emotion, and, on the other, to show the relevance of resorting to philosophical tradition in order to conceptually clarify the difference between cognitive and non-cognitive approaches to emotions, as well as the constitutive elements of a cognitive approach to emotion, which I describe as «practicallycognitive» in (...) order to differentiate it from the rationalist one, which was criticized by James. (shrink)

I explore Hume’s argument for the existence of government, in which he articulates psychological and social elements. Given the human tendency to satisfy the proximate above the remote interests, the fulfilment of the rules of justice, which makes social cooperation possible, must be warranted by the artifice of government. Once the government is in place, it also performs a coordinating function, which strengthens preexistent activities, such as commerce. Indirectly, the government fulfils also a civilizing function -/- Resumen. Se explora el (...) argumento con el que Hume justifica la existencia del gobierno, articulando elementos psicológicos y sociales. Dada la tendencia natural a satisfacer antes los intereses próximos que los remotos, el cumplimiento de las normas de justicia, que hace posible una cooperación social efectiva, debe remediarse mediante un artificio, el gobierno. Una vez introducido, cumple también una función coordinadora, que potencia las actividades que naturalmente le preceden, especialmente el comercio. Indirectamente, ejerce también una función civilizadora. (shrink)

Investigaciones recientes sobre la Ilustración escocesa han dirigido nuestra atención a la conexión entre filosofía moral y el surgimiento de las ciencias sociales en este periodo. Como testigos privilegiados del proceso de modernización, los filósofos escoceses desarrollaron un enfoque original de los problemas morales, planteando, entre tanto, cuestiones de orden epistemológico que son cruciales para entender el posterior desarrollo de la sociología. En la base de esas cuestiones epistemológicas se encuentra la referencia a la razón práctica que da título de (...) este volumen. (shrink)

This book brings together a number of contributions dealing with certain fundamental structures of practical rationality, as they are presented in the areas of the philosophy of action and normative ethics, namely: intentionality, normativity, and reflexivity. With the term “intentionality,” is meant a set of problems that are linked not only with the teleological structure of praxis-oriented rationality, but also with its temporal structure. “Normativity”, in turn, refers to a distinct set of problems, which cannot simply be reduced to those (...) entailed in the intentional nature of human action, even if this notion incorporates a reference to the good or value in its very structure. Finally, with the term “reflexivity” we point at the linkage between the normative dimension of reason with both the contingent circumstances of action and the moral receptivity of the agent, as it is experienced in moral judgment. (shrink)

Polo's anthropology differs both from aristotelian and modern anthropology in his concept of person. In this paper, I explore the ethical relevance of this concept and its conection with the concept of "human nature", which Polo assumes making a distinction between "essence" and "type". This distinction is important in order to focus the ethical aspect of the relationship between nature and culture correctly.

The present collection brings together a number of studies interested in highlighting the role of reflexivity and sentiment in Kant's philosophy. If philosophy is by definition a reflective endeavor, Kant's writings document a particularly powerful philosophical enterprise; not only because he constitutes reflexivity itself into the cornerstone of philosophical method, but also because, in doing so, he unveils fundamental structures of human subjectivity. Authors in this volume have succeeded in highlighting how Kant's commitment to reflexivity represents a privileged gateway of (...) exploring the complexity and richness of human experience. Aesthetic and moral experiences are particularly eloquent in this regard: aesthetic and moral sentiments represent for Kant a particular site of human reflexivity, which bring to light a specifically human world, marked by different kinds of normativity, in the midst of which humans actually live. (shrink)

Las primeras teorías sociológicas son deudoras de las filosofías ilustradas de la historia, las cuales aparecieron para proporcionar un marco de sentido a la acción moral, una vez que la teoría moral renunció a los compromisos metafísicos de la filosofía moral premoderna. Al tiempo que defendió la autonomía de la sociología frente a la filosofía, Durkheim le prescribió a aquélla una tarea específica: realizar una ciencia moral que atendiendo a dos rasgos con los que los hechos morales se muestra a (...) la conciencia —solidaridad y coerción— pueda dar cuenta del sentido moral de la división del trabajo, hasta entonces considerado un proceso casi natural. El propósito de este artículo es mostrar cómo el enfoque durkheimiano permite descubrir una semejanza estructural entre el análisis sociológico y la tradicional perspectiva filosófico-moral de las obligaciones mutuas. (shrink)

The first sociological theories are indebted to Enlightenment philosophy of history, which first appeared to provide a framework of meaning for moral action once moral theory had renounced the metaphysical commitments of early modern moral philosophy. While defending the autonomy of sociology from philosophy, Durkheim prescribed a specific task for sociological thought, namely: develop a moral science which, by keeping together the two features with which moral facts appear before conscience —solidarity and coercion— could account for the moral sense of (...) the division of labour, a phenomenon previously considered almost a natural process. The purpose of this article is to show how Durkheim’s approach makes room for us to establish a structural similarity between sociological analysis and the perspective of mutual obligations characteristic of the moral philosophical tradition. (shrink)

Amidst prevailing debates that construe rationality and emotionality as polar opposites, this book explores the manner in which emotions shape not only prevailing conceptions of rationality, but also culture in general terms, making room for us to speak of an 'emotional culture' specific to late-modern societies. Presenting case studies involving cultural artefacts, narratives found in fictional and non-fictional literature and television programs, speech patterns and self-talk, fashion, and social networking practices, The Emotions and Cultural Analysis sheds light on the relationship (...) between emotion and culture and the ways in which emotion can be harnessed for the purposes of cultural analysis. (shrink)

This article is an attempt to understand the historical origins of the conceptual distinction between "ethics" and "morals" -as we can find it, for instance, in Habermas. I show also how such a distinction works on the contemporary ethical discussion, not only framing the controversy between liberals and communitarians, but also limiting our possibilities to overcome that controversy.